Of all the recommendations made in the study, "The Eastern Latvian Border: Potential for Trans-Frontier Co-operation with Russia", by Daina Bleiere and Rolands Henins, to deal with the problems and challenges toward its border with Russia, I find the ninth recommendation the most telling, that "government institutions must devote more attention to the negative influence which the border has on the lives of border region residents, but this attention must not hinder national security or the strength of the border." (1)   Many of the so-called recommendations on how to deal with the issue are similarly vague, such as the third, "consider structural efficiency" or the seventh, to "study Euroregions". (2)  In fact, many of the proposed recommendations are simply pointing out areas which the authors feel should be studied more, as well proposals that such further studies would be ideal for receiving European Union grants to improve the situation. Only academics and Europeans could call further studies as proposed "solutions" to problems. The real solutions require greater investing directly into the region by both government and private enterprises, but that is unlikely to be done soon without increased border cooperation. Without that commitment to investment or cooperation, it makes "devoting more attention" and conducting more studies seem like an palatable substitute for real progress.

          I find the ninth recommendation to be the most indicative of the real situation because I feel it points out the situation most clearly, as well as the limits of what can be done. The recent border between Latvia and Russia went from being a "soft" border to being a "hard" border, (3) and it will only harden further as European integration proceeds. A soft border can be defined as easily crossed and not an impediment to business, commerce, or travel.  A hard border can be an obstacle to business, travel, and commerce requiring visas for travel, cost-prohibitive licenses, fees, or extra taxes or duties on doing business in or moving goods across the border. Hard borders are walls which can constrict the circulation or life blood of a society economically speaking, and poverty can increase around them because of this isolation, cutting them off in those directions from the areas around them, like peninsulas, but unlike water, borders can be even less easily traversed as the distance is political, not environmental, and that distance can be severe.

          The ninth recommendation, as I mentioned, not only suggests a need to look into possible negative effects of the new border, but also even the "attention" paid must "not hinder the national security or the strength of the border", as if just studying about the issue can be a threat to stability. In other words, it is admitting that there can be increased problems such as greater poverty in regards to areas around the border, but that even just talking about those issues must be begun or allowed only in a way that does not include any discussion of weakening or "softening" of the border.

          One of the greatest advantages to EU membership is to participate in the Schengen Agreement, to reduce effective barriers between your state and the rest of the European Union, thus allowing greater movement of business across other borders that will soften as a result of being allowed to join such an agreement when it comes into force for your country. Other border towns toward EU member states would benefit, the country as a whole would benefit, but only as long as the "strength" of the non-EU "outside" border is up to those standards a that would permit membership in such a free market and unrestricted border zone.

          So while some areas of the country will benefits from freer, less restricted movements of goods, services, and people, towns up against the new wall will become more isolated as they become the new outer border of the EU, which must be strengthened and maintained more rigorously. While such newer suggested studies can recommend that more money be put into development projects in these newer economically hard hit "harder" border regions that have been more cut-off from their surroundings, common sense dictates that even greater amounts of money than now will be spent increasing the infrastructure of the regions not cut-off, but now are more opened up to other regions to attract even greater movement of goods through their countries. Given a choice to build better roads to now more isolated regions of their country, one might think it would make more sense economically for Latvia to first build better roads across their country aimed at increasing interstate commerce between the capitals and other major cities of the region not outside the EU borders. The areas of or along the best new circulation routes would continue to get a greater share of investment and the regions more isolated would get less development for the country as a whole to gain the quickest economic development and the fastest return on investment.

          On the Russian side of the border, it is another story. They cannot benefit from a more closed, harder, strengthened border as Latvia can. The hardening of their border to Latvia does not vastly increase their trading opportunities as it does for Latvia, and the increased poverty on their side of the border in Pskov Oblast will most likely get even less attention and less general national relief as similar cut-off regions on the Latvian side of the border might get government support. 

          In a lot of ways the situation in Pskov Oblast is similar to Kaliningrad region after it was isolated from the rest of Russia. Though Pskov is not completely cut-off from Russia as Kaliningrad, it is now a far less developed part of Russia up against a wall of the EU to a large degree and can either benefit from that proximity with greater cross-border trade and cooperation, or suffer more than other regions if such agreements cannot be worked out. Politics also has a direct connection on foreign investment. If the politics of the region are perceived as stable, Pro-Western, being near the EU could be as helpful for Pskov as it was for Kaliningrad in the 1990's, should large Western companies choose to set up factories there as BMW and Kia did in the Kaliningrad area. (4)  However, this was due not only to proximity but confidence in the local government in the Kaliningrad region, and a freer hand to make such agreements with that local government in a Free Economic Zone, with less interference from Moscow. (5)

          To lessen the poverty and disadvantages in being more isolated "on the fringe" in towns near hard borders, more cooperation between states and more investment into regions over the border promote cross and mutual economic development. However, though both border town regions in this case are relatively poor in regards to their respective countries, investment is considered more in terms of the West investing into Russia, than in Russia investing to shift its industries into the more expensive, more heavily regulated EU. Selling to the EU, Russia has an interest in. Building new factories or shifting jobs there, no. So while it is in Russia's greater interest to work out border agreements if based on what would benefit their local regions most, that is not necessarily the predominant influence on national policy. Though one could argue not having agreements hurts Russian towns near the border more than Latvians ones, by making large foreign investments less attractive where Pskov might benefit as Kaliningrad did, Russia being a much larger country than Latvia has found this an acceptable loss because of ongoing hostilities and grievances with Latvia in general.

          As I have mentioned, the political distance between regions can be more severe than seas, or even oceans. The Cold War made some borders nearly impenetrable, making it easier to go from New York to Tokyo for some than to go from West Berlin to East Berlin, never mind from East Berlin to West Berlin. While there is no Cold War currently, needing visas makes it difficult and expensive for ordinary people to visit each other who were friends and neighbors, or even to visit the graves of their own loved ones. Without even border treaties, and often open hostility between governments manifested in the press in place of greater inter-border cooperation, it is the ordinary people who suffer.

         The only way in my opinion to increase that cooperation is by addressing the causes of these grievances between the countries with open dialog and human to human contact. That is why I commend the Latvian President, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, for her decision to go to Moscow to attend the upcoming 60th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany this May in Moscow, despite the criticism by others in her country and other Baltic States that such a visit would be caving into pressure by Russia to attend an event which will no doubt be orchestrated to a maximum PR (Public Relations) effect by Putin. Such a gesture costs nothing politically, and any PR spin by Putin on the meaning of what it is which that visit symbolizes can be adeptly minimized or used to her own advantage by giving her own interpretations, and if it were to be unpopular in her country, could be shown as having political courage. However since most are evenly divided or in favor of such a visit, such political courage is not necessary, just the will to overcome the risk of being portrayed negatively or used politically by someone else. Should a border agreement result, such fleeting words in newspapers will not matter so much as beginning to have the prospect for a more solid written foundation to build greater inter-border cooperation upon.

          Though the hostility and disagreements which make these particular border's issues are profound, such greater issues ignore or supercede the needs of the people in the regions near the borders. On the Baltic side, they are willing to sign finalized border treaties which can be the foundation of other agreements, though that is not as immediately as important to them as when it was once a requirement for them to join NATO. On the Russian side, having in the past believed it was more important to "punish" the Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia by denying them the border treaties which they so badly had wanted, even if Russian border towns stood to benefit from such agreements as well, cited Russian minority issues and treatment in those countries as the primary reason for not signing such agreements.

          These local border issues and Russian minority issues are now seen as part of a greater EU / Russian border situation, and hopefully this will lead to some progress in finalizing the borders, which can stand to benefit the towns caught in the middle of international political wrangling over borders which have been more or less long agreed upon. So while the cooperation needed for accelerating economic development into the region has been stalled until now, greater studies into the problem get recommended as if studying the problem in ever greater detail means anything good would come to the people adversely affected by now having less or limited inter-border cooperation or understandings. Conduct all the questionnaires, print all the positive stories you want in newspapers about how great or just-like-you the people on the other side of the border are, but peoples' attitudes are not the major obstacles that border regions face. Even if they hated each other, they still most likely would be willing to do business with each other if it were not for the hurdles that having to go through borders creates for doing business with those on the other side if they saw it as potentially profitable enough.

          Thus I believe there is a real chance that moving the issue from simply being bilateral state to state issues into a greater EU/Russia context will help it overcome the negative feelings between the capitals which have kept such cooperation from becoming more developed as borders between friendly states or even just civil neighbors. The more contacts there are, the more people can more easily work, travel, and do business on the other side, the more likely friendships or at least better working relationships between the states and peoples can occur and will develop.

          The border between EU member states and Russia will most likely have to be a "hard" border for some time to come. Differences in rule of law, differences in the perceived effectiveness of law enforcement and corruption, economic disparities, will most likely result in an even greater hardening of the border in the future, but hopefully managed and offset somewhat by greater and more flexible border agreements. Also more broadly defined and stricter enforcement of borders is always a political football issue and no side or political party in the European Union would likely wish to argue in favor of more open or porous borders. (6)  However, the harder the borders become, the more the daily reminders you have that those on the other side are, and will always be the "other", (7)  and you start to build something psychological, a wall of a different sort, a feeling which can remain like a ghost, long after even if all borders were to come down and become non-existent, as in the case of East and West Germans who still tend to think of themselves in those terms, and might still for a generation or two more.