Mass Mobilizations Aiming at Ensuring Electoral Revolutions
Against Corruption Are Recognized and Upheld
 

A Comparative Analysis of Popular Political Mobilizations and Protests in Venezuela in 2002
and Ukraine in 2004

By Jared DuBois

1) Introduction

           All governments are corrupt to some degree. All suffer from a legitimacy gap. All nations are ruled by a small group of privileged elites who usually use their access to power to benefit themselves and their families and friends financially, or those of their own ideology, party, profession, or favor. This is most often a lawyer class which specializes in the law and usually pass laws that benefit their profession, making it more necessary and more tightly integrated to the center which their society revolves around. This is changing to some degree now with a new "business class" beginning to make its presence felt in politics, who see running a country as the same as running a business, and with a profit motive always in mind. While those with the most money have always enjoyed special access to power and often are in the majority of the representatives, even when the majorities of the public in their countries are quite poor, this new idea of putting businessmen and CEO's in charge, running a government as a profit making enterprise, this is especially prone to greater corruption, except for those countries like the US which do not consider favoritism for sale to the highest bidder (lobbying) for contracts and influence illegal. For governments willing to embrace the idea that the bottom line is all that matters, that a government is only after all just another business, another form of corporation, such is the logical new direction to take and corporate CEO's and business leaders are ready to step into the top government jobs to take us there, for a price.

           Corruption, nepotism, cronyism; they are all considered bad yet also tactically accepted by the general public, though movements often form or flare up suddenly from the static background to deal with these issues at certain points in time, sparking rebellions, social movements, and sometimes successful revolutionary movements. When the interests of the greater portions of any given public are usually not represented in priorities or positions by their governments, or their masses generally do not believe that their governments put their own concerns above big businesses, their wealthy elites, or foreign countries gaining or exerting influences, they can become increasingly politically active and more prone to participate in such movements. But if as I maintain, governments are always focused on their elites, always self-serving to a smaller portion of the public or even to themselves, what factor is key to why such movements succeed among the many diverse factors which turn the passive acceptance of the day to day corruption people take for granted, into successful movements to overthrow the current status quo in hopes of something better?

           In this paper I will try to define which factor might be paramount via the examples of two movements which I define as populist-based in that they involved a large portion of the public in demonstrations; one to overturn an attempted coup in Venezuela in 2002, and the other to overturn a discredited election in Ukraine in 2004. By the choice of these two cases, I hope to illustrate what factor was key to why they occurred when they did, and why they were ultimately successful.
 

2) Method of Comparison

           The comparative method I chose for this line of inquiry was the Method of Agreement, in which two very different countries of movements with a similar aim (in this case to prevent a circumventing of the rightful electoral processes winner) and which had similar successful results are studied to find the one key variable that was the same in both cases, (1)  and thereby may have been of greater influence. While there are some similarities between Venezuela and Ukraine, there are many more differences between the two countries and the movements are at odds in what most, including myself, consider to often be a key factor, the prospect of outside help or support of the international community's wealthiest countries for the times down the road.

           In regards to the so-called "second wave" of democratic revolutions (2) in the former USSR and Eastern Europe (Serbia 2000, Georgia, 2003, Ukraine 2004), some have maintained that outside interference, NGO's, the European Union, and especially the US have been instrumental in effecting these movements, (3)  an argument I believe is not without merit. While outside money and the idea of gaining greater backing of richer countries to develop your economy or just enrich yourself if you make the changes that you think those countries or corporations want you to make, to take a stand against an election those countries and groups would agree with you on as having been rigged, these factors are great in helping success and even more, inspiring people to believe that successful opposition is possible, or even that the regime will have to back down at some point. The Russian Federation and other FSU republics have been claiming these new "revolutions" were merely constructs to gain influence, (4)  remembering well how quickly their influence and their own governments collapsed when facing the same questions of legitimacy in a similar succession of popular uprisings 15 years ago, and the propensity their own public and officials had to turn westward in their thinking because that was where the money and outside support were perceived to be found.

           In my mind, these "colored" revolutions are not true revolutions, more replacing one discredited leadership with another group of oligarchs or different oligarchs' supporters, often within the same circles of power, promoting much the same agenda as the previous leaderships, and often just as corrupt. (5)  Also I believe that they are not true revolutions because they came about within the normal electoral processes, albeit with greater hurdles than most countries must face to get a fair accounting of votes. They do qualify though as popular movements which are political in nature.

           Similarly, the uprising in Venezuela in 2002 I found as a good test case against these because it was much more different to all of these movements than to compare them with each other, and to give context to these new "colored" revolutions in that the time frame is the same. The popular uprising there was also to keep an election result from being overturned, likewise not a complete abandoning of the electoral process or the previous system. Therefore, it too I would describe as a social movement, not a revolution, so they can be compared as social movements in the same time period with similar electoral leadership goals (Presidential). And on what I consider often a key point, the interference of and/or support of outside countries, namely the US, Venezuela was at a polar opposite of the recent Eastern European movements support of them by the US.

Similarities:
Both Ukraine and Venezuela have some similarities. While their cultures and histories are different than each other, they have had similar factors which influenced their political development. Both are new to being "legitimate" democracies after centuries of being dominated by strong dictatorships affiliated with powerful neighbors: Russia/USSR in the case of Ukraine, and the US in the case of Venezuela (though the US has had influence over the governments in Venezuela, Venezuela has not had the extreme changes and complete restructuring of the economic system which Ukraine had in changing both to and away from Communism within the last 80 years). Both are currently experiencing rapid growth rates in their economies, (6)  though in the case of Ukraine, it comes as a bump after a long period of economic stagnation and decline, first under the USSR and then after a recent severe recession in the 1990's in which inflation reached 10,000% over a period of two years. (7)  The average income is roughly the same, though the Gini index measuring the income distribution is markedly different with a much less disparity between the rich and poor in Ukraine, (8)  though that means most there are equally poor rather than equally well off, relative to other nations in the region.
Differences:
While both countries are roughly the same in average income with large numbers of poor people, they are at nearly opposite ends of the Gini index of measuring the relative poverty between the rich and poor within their own countries and are also moving in opposite directions due to their governments policies. Ukraine, with many people who are poorer relative to other countries, has not experienced the extreme differences in wealth because its social programs have not been dismantled as much as in some former Communist states. It scores equality within the country itself at favorable rates above countries such as Canada and not far less of an equality rating amongst its citizens than in the Nordic/Scandinavian countries which have the highest degree income equality, though that equality is now declining in Ukraine. Venezuela by contrast has and always had one of greatest disparities between rich and poor in the world with a far higher percentage living below poverty level (49% of total population (compared to 30% for Ukraine), (9)  factors which are not noticeable by average income figures alone which can say nothing of the conditions of most people within a society), yet the situation is improving due to government land distributions and increasing social spending in contrast to Ukraine's movements to restructure away from state spending which have been increasing poverty. With high oil prices, Venezuela is benefiting as one of the richest countries in world in terms of oil revenues as one of the largest exporters, while Ukraine by comparison is dependent upon other countries to meet its energy needs, a large importer of oil potentially in danger of recession or even a depression if oil remains as high as the current $60 a barrel, (10)  twice what it was a few years ago. Venezuela also has a young and growing population in marked contrast to Ukraine with an aging population (median age of 25 compared to 38 for Ukraine). (11)  Worse, Ukraine also has a negative growth rate in overall population which will put further strains on its economy because the fewer being born will be less able to support those far larger numbers at the higher end of the scale, almost half of whom are already too old to have more children and fast approaching retirement age. This is a demographic nightmare for future economic growth for Ukraine and bound to increase the inability at keeping social spending anywhere near current levels, inevitably increasing the number living below poverty level which is already at almost a third of the population. Also different are the population numbers and geographical sizes, with Ukraine having nearly twice the population of Venezuela (42-47 million compared with 22-25 million (numbers are varying estimates)) living on 1/3 less land (600k sq. kilometers vs. 900k sq. kilometers for Venezuela). (12)
3) Theoretical Discussion

           The two approaches I will to attempt frame these uprisings or mass mobilizations against a perceived attempted voiding of their rightfully elected Presidents are: the Political Opportunity Theory approach; as well as attempting to define them from Marxist approach or point of view.

            The Political Opportunity Theory states that people are more likely to engage in public protests and take action when they feel the political structure is weakened after having been previously dominating or even oppressive. Once there is perceived to be a new or sudden opening for change, people begin to mobilize and a sea change in public attitude begins to take place which can enable the revolution or movement to break through and become dominant and ultimately successful in achieving its aims. This theory precludes as I have stated in the introduction to be the case; that people are always prone to or have reason to rebel or at least become more politically active against any society which is fundamentally elite-based, and they will do so and become more active when they sense that there is a new opportunity presented to them to affect real substantial changes to benefit themselves or their society. This perception of empowerment or opportunity then becomes itself a factor in motivating them to greater activity, and this can have a snowball effect, for the more others feel empowered, the more they become empowered, and the more likely others become to join in. This approach views opportunities as key turning points, but that though the potential for change is always there, the perception and catalysts are greater at some points than others and are major factors in the movements. (13)

            The typical Marxist approach is that the pressure upon the working class or Proletariat is constant and unending, and though possibly not necessarily always equal in severity, it too is a constant force for potential for change. One can say if the oppression is constant, from a purely Marxist point of view then the greater oppression would lead to an increase in the likelihood to rebel or participate in mass uprisings or protests. The greater the downward pressure felt, the greater the response would likely be to counter growing or increasingly oppressive regimes if that regime was increasingly undermining or exploiting its own underclass Proletariat and a Marxist view tends to frame all such struggles along class-based lines.

            While both theories of social revolution or mobilization state that the pressure or desire for change is unending (in Marxism, at least unending until there is an equality or loss of previous classes into one equal non-class-based society), the Political Opportunity Theory states that a key factor is the lessening of control or event which signals an opportunity to rebel might prove successful, (14)  whereas one would think under a Marxist approach, the time people are most likely to rebel is when oppression is at its highest.
 

4) Hypothesis 1- Testing the Political Opportunity Theory 

            The election in Ukraine in 2004 which was widely declared fraudulent is a key illustration and good example of the Political Opportunity Theory. A poor impoverished, politically powerless populace was given a golden opportunity at a specific key point in time, a perceived "stolen" election. A new organized opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, with most consolidated opposition support behind him was waiting in the wings, also with broad public support and a large group of expert advisers willing and able to form a new government, and would have had some legitimacy whether they ultimately won or not at the polls. 

           The ruling regime headed by Leonid Kuchma held an election which they had claimed would be free and fair, yet was widely condemned by the outside world as fraudulent to an extreme. Viktor Yanukovich, his chosen successor, was declared the winner which was a catalyst sparking massive protests which continued until the government backed down and conceded to redo the elections, in effect at the same time, perhaps inadvertently admitting that the original result was suspect. At the very least, any discrepancy or downturn in the second election would have been shown to be evidence of fraud in the first, and the momentum could not help but shift toward the opposition since the regime was forced to show weakness by allowing its own official results to be questioned, then thrown out completely by its Supreme Court full of supposedly loyal-to-the-regime judges. This situation of a disputed election, an allegedly hard-line regime having to answer to charges of corruption from its own opposition, from the US, and from the EU, all together declaring the outcome fraudulent, to say this new sudden window of opportunity is what catalyzed the public to take to the streets, then this is quite in agreement with the Political Opportunity Theory and a shining example of it.

            For those who claim the pressure from outside organizations was instrumental in mobilizing public sentiment against the outcome elections, the Western press, the European governments and the United States, all disputing the governments accounting of the vote, though this is not out of line with the Political Opportunity Theory, it could be conceded to be an outside factor which influenced the public's willingness to protest believing that time and history were on their side. However, I feel the key factor in the success was in the government's inability uphold the legitimacy of its counting of the vote. If you don't even have the support of a Supreme Court packed with your own party's appointees, you hardly can claim a mandate to rule, even if you had won the popular vote. Since it was perceived he had not won that either, once forced into holding a repeat of the election, it was clear the regime was all but finished.

           But the key factor which may have influenced its Supreme Court of supposed loyalists to the regime judges to turn against the government which had appointed them, aside from the possible desire to act in the public good and do their jobs honestly or perceiving a bigger payoff for jumping ship and calling for new elections, the deciding factor for them I feel was the growing crowds of people demanding a recount which was pushing the country to a brink of civil war, a risk also because the support of each was centered in a different part of the country and Ukraine remains a "proto-democracy" (15)  with a still emerging sense of nationhood. In such a situation, control of the military is paramount and Yanukovich could not count on the loyalty of the military to back him against the growing masses of demonstrators which he could not have dispersed without that support, and without risking heavy civilian casualties.

            In the Venezuela protests against the coup against Chavez in 2002, similar motivations were at work and similar calculations were made. Massive street protests and the coup leaders inability to count on the military to step in and put down the protests were in my opinion key reasons for the coup's failure and the return of Chavez to power shortly after the coup. Though it is not as clear a case of the Political Opportunity Theory in that it was to restore a leadership, it was perhaps the best and possibly the only opportunity to act because the coup was quickly gathering outside support to cement its hold over the country. The United States, which many have purported to have been behind the coup, denies sponsoring it but also refused to condemn it while considering recognizing the coup leaders as the legitimate government. At the very least, they made clear their tactic support of it by refusing to condemn it. The opportunity to act was sudden, but it too was as fleeting as the opportunity presented to the people of Ukraine by the appearance of a tainted election. And it was the public's willingness to support their elected leadership and the army's refusal to put down their protests by force which was the turning point in that case as well.

            Since the uprising was in support of the recently deposed leadership which was not considered by the majority of the public to be oppressive, certain aspects of the Political Opportunity Theory are not applicable, typically against a long ruling authoritarian system. Yet other aspects of it do apply. The protests were to restore an about to be deposed popularly elected leader against an illegitimate one, so in that case it can be considered as similar to a degree to Ukraine situation, and was aimed at overthrowing an elite-based system about to retake power possibly for years which they had thought they had replaced previously in a fair election. 
 

5) Hypothesis 2- Testing A Marxist Approach 

            The movement in Venezuela can be seen as being in accordance to what one would expect from a Marxist point of view. The Proletariat of a country with an overwhelmingly poor lower class had finally gotten a leadership which acknowledged their plight by willing to pursue land reforms and other policies in-line with giving them greater representation in the leadership, as well as willing to take steps to even out the marked discrepancy between the rich and the majority which were desperately poor in a country which was one of the richest in the world in terms of oil and natural resources.

            When this government which was both sympathetic to their causes and willing to take action to help them was overthrown by what a Marxist would call a Bourgeoisie-based movement to roll back those reforms, the dominant poorer segments of the society acted in accordance with what one would expect from their economic status, and rose up in massive protests to overthrow the opponents of the social reforms. 

            While it is descriptive to some degree of the situation, it is not entirely correct. A Marxist approach does not adequately account for, in my opinion, the importance of personalities. People do not always react purely in accordance with one would expect based upon their economic positions alone because of how they perceive the leadership of the movements. Hugo Chavez also had some support among the wealthier Bourgeoisie, in the middle class because he was considered a charismatic or liked leader. Likewise, people who are desperately poor can support right-wing leaderships or dictatorships because of a strong personality of the leader of the party or government, and the willingness of the media to constantly sing his praises.

             The situation in Ukraine does not lend itself to supporting a Marxist-based explanation of the events. While also having a large poor population, the movement in Ukraine did have significant support among the middle-class, cut across class-based lines, not a class-based action by any means, and the politicians they were backing were not in advocacy of a grand new specific program providing a greater degree of social responsibility by the leadership any more significantly than that which all politicians make, vague promises to somehow help the poor.

            While some were motivated by their desperate economic situations to rise up against a leadership during which their economic situation markedly worsened, the "reform" leadership was in favor of steps which would have the effect of greater privatization, increased ties to what a Marxist's view would call outside "Bourgeoisie"-based richer countries, all with the assumption that this would be most beneficial to their economy. In fact, that greater austerity measures would be needed to bring the country more in-line with a market-based economy, which would have a significant negative effect upon the large segment which were poor, these were the policies advocated by those who much of the poor rebelled in favor of. Not at all how a Marxist would expect the Proletariat to behave. In many of the post-Communist societies of Eastern Europe, Socialism and social-based programs are so discredited, trying to put the events on current politics in a Marxist-based perspective is difficult because of the public's willingness to associate any degree of Socialism with their extremely negative past experiences under oppressive Communist regimes.
 

6) Conclusion

           The Political Opportunity Theory I believe provides the best insight into why these uprisings and social movements occurred when they did, and why they were successful. A key component of an opportunity to move away from a previous type of authoritarian regime lay in times of temporary disarray and an atypical lessening in ability of the leaderships be able to count on the support of their military to put down the protests. (16)  The efficacy in the timing of perceived specific opportunities was visibly present in both cases which told people if they protested at this key specific point in time they might be successful, and even more importantly, if they hesitated such an opportunity most certainly might not present itself again for years to come. Such twin factors, the greater chance for success in the present, coupled with a visible loss of the opportunity for such a movement to be successful if the public hesitated and did not act immediately, this I believe is what caused the movements to occur on a enough of a scale to be as strong and as effective as they were.

           Marxist approaches to current uprisings and social movements are flawed in my opinion for many reasons beyond the discrediting of Socialism by the totalitarian and semi-totalitarian states of Eastern Europe. People just do not always act in accordance with what one would expect based upon class and their economic situation alone. People are far more nationalistic than Marx or any Socialist ideologue would care to admit. They may act in accordance to their own economic best interests or they may act in total opposition to it supporting, even fervently, leaders and regimes which are hostile to their best interests, out of nationalism, racism, or any number of other reasons.

           All governments are elite-based and all alternatives offered are generally also elite-based. Corruption is endemic to having larger numbers of people ruled by any group. Ideological revolutions, as evidenced by the experiences of Russian and Eastern European states, often brings in just more excuses to take that much more away from those who already have next to nothing. You will lose if you revolt to the left, you will lose if you revolt to the right. Any structural changes to societies will often benefit most those who already have the most, as only they will most often always find a way to profit from, and ride out, the turbulent changes.

           Since current governments and leaderships now most often run for reelection offering no specific well-defined programs, just vague personality-based campaigns without a clear ideological program to adhere to or run against, oppositions become left only with the opportunity to win by becoming centered around a reaction to the perceived greater corruption of the present regime than they say they would deliver should they obtain power. Anti-corruptionalism, if it can be called that, is the only ideology left when your government gives no clear ideological stand to run against, other than to keep things as they are and defies all attempts to label themselves while labeling their opponents with whatever is currently the most unpopular labels. Within a globalized society, whether you are ruled by a so-called democracy, a monarchy, a dictatorship, or a so-called Communist society, they are in the end just labels because they all work together on a supra-national level and all are different pieces of the same pie. The only successful rallying points left is to decry the corruption within the current administration and defend those whom you think are less corrupt. With outside help and support, you may be more likely to have greater opportunities to topple regimes they don't like either, but most often whether changing regimes or just changing leaderships, newcomers will inevitably abuse their power and overstay their welcome eventually. The only question is, how often will the alternatives offered ever again be real ideologically opposed alternatives?
 
 

1)  Skocpol, Theda, , 1980, "The Uses of Comparative History and Macrosocial Inquiry," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Nr. 22, Harvard University, Boston, Pg. 184

2)    Tucker, Joshua A., 2005, "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and the “2nd Wave” of Post-Communist Democratic Revolutions", Princeton University, Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School and Department of Politics, www.wws.princeton.edu/jtucker

3)    Engdahl, F. William, "Color Revolutions, Geopolitics and the Baku Pipeline", Centre for Research on Globalization,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=ENG20050625&articleId=518

4)    Treanor, James, “Revolutions in the Former Soviet Union: Second Wave or Something Else?” Program Brief: A publication of The Nixon Center, Vol. 11, No. 7, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Washington DC, 

5)    Lavelle, Peter, Bugajski, Janusz, Frolov, Vladimir, et. al. "The Specter of “Staglution” in the Former Soviet Union", www.russiaprofile.org/experts_panel/article.wbp?article-id=12C94421-8461-41A5-B283-357002422C2E

6)    2005, The World Factbook, USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ve.html, and www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/up.html

7)    Evans, Andrew, 2004, Ukraine, Bradt Travel Guides Ltd., Bucks, Pg. 5 

8)    2003, United Nations Human Development Reports, www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_126_1_1.html

9)    2005, The World Factbook, USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ve.html

10)    2005, "Oil prices settle below $60 a barrel", ($59.76) Microsoft/NBC, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5612507/

11)    2005, The World Factbook, USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ve.html, and www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/up.html

12)    Times Books, 1997, The Times Atlas of the World, Bath Press, London, Pg. 30-32

13)    Tarrow, Sidney, 1998, Power in Movement: Social movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Pg. 76-77

14)    Tarrow, Sidney, 1998, Power in Movement: Social movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Pg. 76-77

15)    Szporluk, Roman, 2000, Russia, Ukraine, and The Breakup of the Soviet Union, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, Pg. 320

16)    Przeworski, Adam, 1991, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Pg. 67
 
 

© 2005 By Jared DuBois